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ABSTRACT
This article examines the context in which firms reflect on their 
own history in order to help form their organizational identity. By 
undertaking research in business archives, it shows that external 
change is as important as an internal transition in understanding 
shifts in the way an organization understands its past. We trace 
the messages communicated internally through paintings of past 
chairmen and senior staff when they were displayed inside the head 
office of Lloyds Bank during the 1960s and 1970s. These portraits 
generated interest and were an effective means of non-verbal 
communication which provoked a discussion about the purpose, 
values and norms in the firm’s past, present, and future. The objects 
retold the story of the bank’s success as a privately owned family firm 
in the midst of on-going political debates inside the Labour party 
about the nationalization of large banking companies. With the 
portraits in place, they recognized the bank’s history as a capitalist 
enterprise. The pictures legitimized the tradition of private ownership, 
helped to form organizational identity, and set future obligations that 
would see its continuation in what was a period of potential change.
Introduction
Lloyds is one of the ‘big four’ retail banks in operation across the United Kingdom. In its Head 
Office on Gresham Street in London, the corridors to the boardroom are decorated with 
portraits of chairmen and other senior figures from the firm’s history.1 Those faces on display 
range from Sampson Lloyd II (1699–1779), Lloyds co-founder, to the most recent out-going 
chairman, Sir Winfried Bischoff (1941–). This tradition of finding, acquiring and displaying 
portraits of the bank’s chairman began in the 1960s when the bank was head quartered in 
Lombard Street. It started as a pet project initiated by the chairman of the bank, Sir Harald 
Peake (1899–1978).2 The tradition, initiated by Peake, has survived to the present day as each 
chairman now sits for a portrait on his exit.3 Peake’s successors have continued this practice 
with such enthusiasm that there is no longer enough space to exhibit all the portraits. There 
are portraits hung over two floors, in corridors and reception areas, and several are stored 
in Lloyds Bank Group Archive.
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Through a contextualized understanding of the images and analysis of the material per-
taining to their acquisition, we examine the value of these portraits to the organization. This 
article investigates:
•  Why did Peake collect and display portraits of past bank leaders?
•  What prompted Peake to invest in portraiture as a visual representation of the organ-
ization’s memories?
•  What memories or narratives were thought to be shown through the display of these 
images?
In order to answer these questions, we use material from the Lloyds Bank Group Archive. 
The collection, which documents Peake’s acquisition and display of the portraits, contains 
around 300 manuscript and printed items.4 These sources detail Peake’s motives and the 
way senior managers at Lloyds interpreted the portraits and discussed their meanings. We 
also use a published family history of Lloyds and the portraits themselves, as well as consid-
ering the contexts in which these decisions about the portraits were made.
We begin first by discussing the relevant literature and then our methodology; the value 
of visual sources and historical research in understanding organizational identity and the 
relationship between past, present, and future. The third part explains the background to 
Lloyds bank and Peake’s project. This is followed by a section which examines the importance 
of the corporation’s history as a family firm. Fifth, we consider how the portraits solidified 
Peake’s social status in the firm and the corporate elite. Finally, we consider any internal 
threat to management and also the external context in which the bank was operating, in 
particular, the pressing need for businesses to show resistance to the threat of public 
ownership.
Literature
A tradition, the retelling and repetition of an event, creates a set of future obligations that 
would see parts of this narrative continue and it can also be used as a way of establishing 
authority. An individual can use reminders of the sanctity of age-old rules, as Weber argued, 
as a tool to legitimize the authority of a person as a leader.5 Weber et al. (1978, 212–214) 
explained that authority in this context means that one party will obey the orders of another 
– it was not, as they saw it, power itself or domination of one by another. They considered 
that economic power – that is to ‘dictate the terms of exchange between contractual parties’ 
– is not enough on its own and there must still be ‘attempts to establish and cultivate beliefs 
in its legitimacy’. Weber et al. (1978) believed that ‘obedience is owed not to enacted rules 
but to the person who occupies a position of authority by tradition or who has been chosen 
for it by the traditional master’.
In order to understand why the master or leader occupied this position and others sub-
mitted, the context and application of rules as traditions must also be overtly understood.6 
Hobsbawm (1983, 1), who wrote as a historian rather than as a theorist, shed more light on 
the power of tradition. He argued that this concept was much broader than simply the 
authority of the individual to command others and have his orders obeyed. ‘Traditions’, he 
argued, ‘which appear or claim to be old are often quite recent in origin and sometimes 
invented’. He saw ‘invented traditions’ as a ‘set of practices, normally governed by overtly or 
tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain 
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values and norms of behaviour by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with 
the past’. He added that ‘they normally attempt to establish continuity with the past’. Tradition, 
invented or otherwise, can, therefore, legitimize an individual’s position and also establish 
a set of aims, values, or beliefs.
Within business scholarship, the study of past memory has been criticized in the business 
literature as being ahistorical (Feldman and Feldman 2006). Following the calls made by 
Booth and Rowlinson (2006) for a ‘historic turn’, a shift has begun to take place in the study 
of organizational change. Ten years later business historians have responded energetically 
(Mills et al. 2016; Smith and Russell 2016; Zundel, Holt, and Popp 2016). Such recent research 
has included analysis of rituals and objects. Rituals, as historic events, are filled with rich 
levels of symbolism and actors follow a set of established conventions (Dacin, Munir, and 
Tracey 2010). Objects, such as ornaments, portraits, other paraphernalia and even architec-
ture or museums, exist as a manifestation of a collective memory, a record of a ritual and a 
sign of the organization’s past (Decker 2014). Suddaby, Foster and Quinn Trank (2016, 300) 
assert that ‘monuments, statues, and related shared symbols of the past are uniquely effective 
in creating a sense of commonality in a given social group’. Indeed, these authors emphasize 
the notion of the collective memory as the foundation for identity (2016, 300, 301). In this 
process, objects serve as ‘talking points’ or a ‘show and tell’ (Ames 1980; Rafaeli and Pratt 
1993) to explain the meaning of the act which has taken place.
History can also have an external function in marketing the firm because history can be 
communicated to outsiders as a strategic asset (Brunninge 2009; Suddaby, Foster and Quinn 
Trank 2010). Roowaan (2009, 60) has argued that the use of history is particularly important 
for banks as their service is relatively undifferentiated and longevity confers legitimacy upon 
the organization. History can be manipulated, as shown by Rowlinson and Hassard (1993), 
in their case study of Cadbury. Yet, as Rowlinson et al. (2010) and Maclean et al. (2014) explain, 
a business’s narrative or memory is not always controlled by those with power at the top of 
the hierarchy. Interest and interaction with historical objects provide an opportunity for an 
organization to implant a memory. It can establish a narrative about the firm’s enduring 
purpose and this story can be perpetuated through retelling. Albert and Whetten (1985) 
term this reflective style of analysis by organizational members as organizational identity.
Using history in forming organizational identity often involves sense-making by compa-
nies – a phenomena analyzed in by Ravasi and Schultz (2006) when considering how the 
company Bang and Olufsen used past cultures to make sense of their current situation when 
their identity was under threat. Schultz and Hernes (2013), in their study of the Lego Company, 
analyze the construction of identity ‘in an ongoing present suspended between the past 
and the future’ (2013, 2). In this work, they consider textual, material, and oral memory forms 
that could be used as memory cues. Such memory cues enable those in the present to 
construct organizational identity that complies with current and future requirements: to use 
the past to make sense of their organization in the present and the future (Schultz and Hernes 
2013, 4). When material memory cues, such as artifacts, are utilized, Schultz and Hernes 
(2013) argue that they provide an opportunity for managers to place organizational identity 
in a broader context capable of carrying forward future organizational identity (2013, 6).
Suddaby, Foster and Quinn Trank (2016) consider the creation of organizational identity 
as a process, one that ‘requires ongoing management of perceptions of identity in the past, 
present, and future’. They analyze the use of history in creating an identity for the future but 
emphasize that:
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history lacks significance unless it is given meaning by exerting influence on the present con-
stitution and construction of the bond individuals have with their organizations. An organiza-
tion’s history is made relevant to a group by contextualizing past events in the present through 
memory and recollection.
They use the term ‘organizational re-membering’ for this process and describe the ‘rhetorical 
use of the past to create identification’ as a ‘remarkably flexible managerial resource’ that 
can be used to manage change or respond to threats (Suddaby, Foster and Quinn Trank, 
2016, 302–3). They emphasize that history is not objective and may be re-told and re-mem-
bered to create an identity for present and future use by an organization. Suddaby, Foster 
and Mills provide further discussion of the importance of individuals in the process of forming 
organizational identity, urging consideration of ‘human history’ when analyzing organiza-
tions (2013, 113, 114).
While it is clear that objects draw attention to certain organizational behaviors and aims, 
it is less clear why they were chosen to emphasize individuals, events, or periods from their 
past. This article adds to recent work which explores the way organizations interpret and 
react to threats to their identity (Dutton and Dukerich 1991; Elsbach and Kramer 1996; Gioia 
and Thomas 1996; Schultz and Hatch, 2003; Ravasi and Schultz, 2006; Hatch and Schultz, 
2017). Hatch and Schultz (2017) examine the Carlsberg Group, a company that also utilizes 
its heritage to name a product line and to develop the company’s future identity. The 
Carlsberg Group used historical artifacts to develop their identity at periods of organizational 
change and in response to competitive markets. Hatch and Schultz argued that history could 
be of value to corporate identity as it ‘appears to actors at moments when it can be of use’ 
(2017, 36).
In the case of Carlsberg and Lego, the historic artifacts linked to the products that these 
companies manufactured and re-constructed a notion of organizational identity. The process 
also involved the workforces of each company. Smith and Russell (2016) commend this 
approach, arguing that research in management and organizational studies should take on 
a polyphonic methodology to include a wide range of voices. Even so, Hatch and Schulz 
(2017, 4, 5) claim that much of the literature considering history and organizational identity 
does not consider ‘the activities that occur at the micro-level of organizational actors as they 
use that history or why it occurred to actors to use organizational history in the first place’. 
This article will take a micro-level approach and closely examine the motivations of actors 
by analyzing a very particular use of organizational history: the collection and hanging or 
portraits of past Lloyds bank chairmen by the then current chairman, Harald Peake.
Methodology
One of the major challenges which business historians now face is to explain and commu-
nicate their methodologies effectively. Rather than extolling the virtues of a particular the-
oretical framework, recent work, such as that of Decker, Kipping and Wadhwani (2015) and 
de Jong and Higgins (2015), embraces plurality but encourages an explicit methodological 
discussion. This article relies on data collected from archives. While we may not need to 
elaborate much on the concept of an archive for those trained first in history, Decker (2013) 
reminds us that silence is unhelpful, especially for business history as a sub-discipline and 
its audiences based outside of the history department.
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Archival research relies upon the examination of documents which are now held in special 
repositories but were originally created as part of the ordinary or day-to-day recording of 
information. As such, these items generally contain swathes of raw information which have 
not been digested nor condensed by another party; the size and quantity of material therein 
can make the examination and navigation process both cumbersome and time-consuming. 
Despite the difficulties, research with these sources is especially valuable in re-creating an 
account of historical events. Archival material is thought to give the most reliable account 
of the writer’s thoughts or feelings.7 Many are private (as opposed to public) documents as 
they were not written with a view to publication or the intention of being disseminated 
widely. Historians, therefore, consider that they provide an honest insight into an actor’s 
beliefs and his or her decision-making as their thought-process was not influenced by worries 
about contemporary readership, criticism, or judgment.
The archival documents used in this article fit well into the above category – they are, for 
the most part, private correspondence between Peake and Lloyds family members, his sec-
retary, others in senior management, restorers, art specialists, and insurance companies. The 
correspondence between Peake and other executives was private and not intended for 
widespread consumption. Although Peake saved his paperwork, he placed them in the 
archive to assist in the future authentication of the portraits.8 His letters cannot be viewed 
nor accessed by the public at large.9 These sources, therefore, provide a reliable and honest 
account of the way that Peake introduced the portraits to senior managers and the way in 
which they interpreted the meanings of the pictures and the traditions displayed therein. 
When these conversations took place, Peake, as the principal interpreter and founder of the 
tradition, was able to correct a misinterpretation of the painting if it occurred or condone 
new and unanticipated readings.
While the correspondence provides a unique insight into the views of Peake and those 
who looked at the artifacts, the sources used here extend beyond the archival collection 
and also include the portraits themselves, and the published family and corporate history 
which were produced alongside Peake’s project. It is impossible to recreate every conversa-
tion that took place in front of these objects as only a small number (and those of particular 
note or requiring further action) were recorded in Peake’s letters. Nevertheless, we can 
uncover the subject matter of these conversations by examining the bedrock of historical 
facts, evidence, and knowledge which Peake and others in the senior management used to 
interpret the past. The three bodies of sources – the private letters, portraits, and secondary 
sources – are triangulated to show inconsistencies and consistencies in Peake’s portrait col-
lection project and shed much-needed light on the value and meaning of the portraits as 
symbols of an invented tradition.
Despite the strength of private correspondence as sources, there are also considerable 
limitations. Most notably, the letters do not include the voices of ordinary workers. While 
these members of staff undoubtedly had views on their career and the bank’s past, present, 
and its future,10 it was doubtful that they viewed the portrait collection. Given the position 
of the artwork on the top floors, access was limited to senior staff and those at the top of 
the managerial hierarchy. The absence of evidence of written conversations or meetings 
between Peake and ordinary workers within the bank also suggests that access to Peake 
himself was restricted to communicating with high ranking members of staff.
Through the portraits and the discussion of them, Peake communicated various messages 
to be interpreted by receivers about the group of chairman and the history of the bank. In 
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Peake’s letters, he gave an explicit reason for the collection and display of portraits: he 
explained that he did so as there was ‘increasing interest’ in them.11 Given that Peake put 
over ten years’ worth of time and effort into this task, it seems unlikely that his interest was 
as whimsical or casual as he suggested by this brief assessment. To have sustained a project 
for such a long period, and one that demanded a significant amount of time and effort, 
Peake must have felt that they contributed something more meaningful than just being 
‘interesting’ or pleasant to view. Senior managers also saw more in the natural symbolism 
and imagery in art-work than these bland comments suggest.
Background
The nineteenth and twentieth centuries saw a transformation in the shape of industrial 
capitalism; businessmen who were once in a position due to family patronage gave way to 
a new group of professional managers appointed for their competency and bureaucratic 
skills (Chandler 1977). Business historians have long debated whether British big businesses 
lagged behind in the so-called ‘managerial revolution’ or in fact family firms were equal to 
managerial firms (Chandler 1994; Rose 2006; Hannah 2009). Lloyds began as a private bank 
and family firm. It was established in 1765 by John Taylor, Sampson Lloyd, and their two 
sons. Ownership and management was passed on from one generation to the next in the 
same way that family members would bequeath property and wealth to their relatives. But 
by the 1960s, when Peake began his portrait collection project, ownership and position was 
no longer inherited. The Taylor family had exited the business in 1865 and the bank had 
converted from private ownership to joint-stock status in the same year. In the 1960s, the 
firm appointed non-family members to the board of directors who were experienced man-
agerial staff, such as Harald Peake,12 yet it had not shaken off its relationship with the family 
entirely. Family members still enjoyed high-ranking positions in the bank and those family 
members outside the bank maintained a close personal relationship with the firm’s execu-
tives. Indeed, we can see the strength of Peake’s social connection to the Lloyd’s family in 
his letters about the portraits.13
Peake’s letters reveal how he often conversed with members of the extended Lloyds 
family over luncheon or dinner and showed them around the firm’s Head Office. His corre-
spondence also reveals when he obtained portraits to be displayed in the bank, how he 
established their provenance as historical artifacts and, more importantly, what he saw as 
their material value and natural symbolism. Thirteen pictures were collected or commis-
sioned in total. This information is represented by Table 1 (below). While Peake aimed initially 
to collect images of chairmen, he soon expanded beyond this list to other senior individuals 
in the bank’s history. Of thirteen listed, only the final four chairmen (Vassar Smith, Wardington, 
Balfour, and Franks) were immediately in Peake’s possession when he became chairman.14 
Of the remaining paintings identified by Table 1, Peake searched for and acquired them from 
other parties, mostly the Lloyds family. The image of Howard Lloyd was kept in a branch and 
later transferred to the Head Office.
The portraits were exhibited in select locations. After Peake had acquired the portrait of 
Thomas Henry Salt, he wrote to its former owner, Lady Salt, to update her and thanked her 
for her assistance. He explained that ‘the picture now hangs in a place of honour in the lobby 
leading to the Boardroom’.15 The images were positioned in the Board Room and upper floors 
of Lloyds Head Office in Lombard Street and were therefore viewed internally, but only by 
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those who sat at the top of the hierarchy and occupied or travelled through these rooms. 
The paintings became part of a story which management told about themselves to them-
selves. The firm’s history was on show; it was given a prominent position. In these rooms, 
Peake controlled the lighting,16 the portrait’s positioning, and the centrality of the image to 
the room. Part of the latter point was purely a matter of interior design. It ensured that those 
who entered the area would look attentively at the portrait in a way that they might feel was 
almost natural, although, of course, there was nothing natural about it. Much effort had 
been made to collect the portraits from disparate locations and through thoughtful posi-
tioning and proper staging, the portrait could draw focus and communicate meanings effec-
tively. At eye level, and in corridors or lobbies with relatively high levels of footfall, they would 
be a focal point and looked upon frequently. Peake seemed to be successful in this as he 
noted in one of his letters that the portraits were ‘the subject of much favourable comment’ 
and ‘attracting much interest’. To engage audiences further, he placed a note nearby to give 
a biography of the sitter.17
The pictures featured the likeness of individuals in a medium thought to preserve the 
image of those in power in a prestigious and permanent way. As portraiture elevated the 
sitter to a high social status visually (Barnes and Newton, 2017a), it could be a useful tool in 
establishing personal authority if shown to an internal audience. Peake’s picture is displayed 
in Figure 1. Yet, Peake was far from the archetypical art patron who used a portrait to vainly 
establish his own personal authority. The images, when acquired, existed as a collection – 
they communicated the story of a group of bankers rather than of one protagonist or the 
heroic entrepreneur. Peake did not benefit directly from his portrait as he did not sit for it 
when he chaired the bank, nor did he hang any other images of himself in the bank while 
in office as chairman. As per tradition, the chairman sat for his picture on exit, not when he 
was in office.18 Any personal authority or status gained from having his portrait on show and 
hung in exclusive locations would have been felt after Peake left rather than during his 
Table 1. the portraits collected by Harald Peake.
Name Life Position Origin Place/floor 
sampson lloyd ii 1699–1779 Partner in taylor & lloyds 
1765–1779 
Copy of portrait 5 
sampson lloyd iii 1728–1807 Partner in taylor & lloyds 
1779 
Original 4 
John taylor i 1704–1771 Partner in taylor & lloyds Copy of portrait Board room 
John taylor ii 1738–1814 Partner in taylor & lloyds 
1779 
Copy of portrait 4 
timothy Kendrick 1807–1885 Chairman 1865–1868 Original. artist W.t. roden 5 
sampson samuel lloyd 1820–1899 Chairman 1868–1886 Original on permanent 
loan. artist unknown 
Board room 
thomas salt 1890–1904 Chairman 1866–1898 reproduction of painting 
by Frank Holl 
5 
John spencer Phillips 1874–1909 Chairman 1898–1909 Original on permanent 
loan. artist H.Harris 
Brown 
4 
sir richard Vassar smith 1843–1922 Chairman 1909–1922 Oil painting Board room 
lord Wardington 1869–1950 Chairman 1922–1945 Oil painting Board room 
lord Balfour of Burleigh 1883- Chairman 1945–1954 Oil painting Board room 
lord Franks 1905- Chairman 1954–1962 Oil painting Board room 
Howard lloyd 1837–1920 secretary 1862, general 
Manager 1871, Director 
1902 
Original by Percy Biglend. 
Formerly at Colmore row 
Branch 
4 
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tenure. With four paintings of the chairmen that preceded him in existence, Peake could 
well have followed in this tradition without drawing much comment or attention. In other 
words, he did not need to collect the pictures of others to normalize his portrait or solidify 
his position as leader. The tradition of painting bank chairmen had already been established. 
Extending the portraiture to the early chairman before Vassar Smith did Peake’s reputation 
no harm but was not an exercise in self-aggrandizement. Rather, more broadly, it enhanced 
the identity of the organization as a whole. We now turn to discuss why he collected those 
images in more detail.
Continuing the family firm tradition
It was some 200 years after the Lloyds family entered into the banking business when Peake 
started collecting portraits, in the mid-1960s. All of the Lloyds responsible for running the 
bank during its first 100 years were long dead by this time, and their sons, daughters, and 
other immediate family had also passed. Their portraits, and those of chairmen outside the 
Lloyds family, while kept by the second or third generation decedents in private ownership, 
Figure 1. Portrait of Harald Peake.
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were of individuals who had long been forgotten. In one negotiation, Peake thought that 
he was lucky to talk to the owners as he believed that if they ‘had died it was unlikely that 
anyone would have known who the portrait represented’.19 Another portrait, the image of 
Sampson Samuel Lloyd, was kept out of sight in an attic.20 To those who owned and looked 
at the picture, it existed as an empty vessel because the sitter was unknown and had lost 
his original persona. The artifact, once collected by Peake, presented an opportunity to 
recreate a history and, as others could not recall the story of the portrait and its sitter, Peake’s 
version of the past could pass unchallenged.
As Peake was telling the story of a group of managers rather than establishing the author-
ity of one individual, what did Peake know about his predecessors? What could he have said 
about them? What values did they share? A number of sources were used to provide historical 
facts. While Peake investigated and pursued the people in the portraits over the course of 
over ten years, initially he did not know whether their portraits still existed or even if some 
family members had ever been painted. He appears to have taken as a starting point the 
portraits reproduced in Sayers’ history of Lloyds Bank, published in 1957.21
The other source of historical evidence was the families themselves, although, as we have 
indicated, not all were very knowledgeable about their ancestors. The search became a quest 
to find a relevant portrait and, if it had been passed down through the generations, to locate 
the family member who possessed it. Success was a result of perseverance and a number 
of lunches, liaising, and networking among the Lloyd family, not pure happenstance. Peake 
often used the help of other family members and, most prominently, Humphrey Lloyd. 
Humphrey Lloyd acted as Peake’s expert guide as he uncovered forgotten information 
through his research into the family’s history. Peake’s project coincided with Humphrey 
Lloyd’s investigation into the role of the Quakers during the industrial revolution. The Lloyd’s 
family, who were Quakers, naturally featured. He used his familial network to find images, 
personal papers, and correspondence to write biographies of the key individuals which 
could be weaved into his story of industrialization. In a set of mutual ambitions, Peake and 
Lloyd identified the holders of the portraits through numerous conversations, meetings, 
and introductions to distant family members.22 Humphrey Lloyd’s knowledge of the people 
and his family could then be used to frame the bank’s understanding of its past. As Humphrey 
Lloyd published his research as a monograph in 1975, we can use it to establish his inter-
pretation of events and the facts which he shared with Peake. Looking back on the founders 
of Lloyds bank, Humphrey Lloyd (1975, 275) said that:
The mind turns back to the quality and talents of Charles the banker, to John in London, as con-
sistent and useful as Nehemiah in Birmingham [who] was useless, to their brother, Sampson the 
Third, established, right-minded, able, but not talented like Charles; to the father of these men, 
Sampson the Second, for whom everything came right, who built for the future; to Sampson 
the First who took the risk ….
By referring to these individuals by their first name, Humphrey Lloyd suggested his famil-
iarity to his actors and gave them a sense of character and personality. While Lloyd did not 
hold all of his ancestors in high regard, not all were shown and recognized in the bank 
through portraiture. The ‘useless’ Nehemiah, for example, did not make the cut. The images 
of Sampson Lloyd II (see Figure 2) and Sampson Lloyd III, who were remembered for their 
level-headedness and tenacity, were held up high as examples and role models. Humphrey 
Lloyd may not have identified those two characters as the most talented nor interesting but 
they were, in Humphrey Lloyd’s eyes, successful.
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E.V. Lucas, an essayist, playwright, and poet, wrote in the introduction to an early history 
of Lloyds bank by Samuel Lloyd’s that ‘[o]ne thing is certain: that a king may be an accident 
and yet reign for half a century; whereas a banker can never be so. A banker has got to be a 
banker or go’ (1908, viii). His comment was later republished in a short pamphlet entitled 
The Lloyds of Lloyds Bank as a supplement to the bank’s staff magazine. Lucas explained why 
the bank had a long history of family management and ownership. His words also said 
something of the fragility and difficulty of running a bank successfully but the passage of 
time and longevity meant that those at the top had been triumphant – running the bank 
profitably and keeping it in business was not a trifling feat. By using Lucas’ words, those in 
the firm shared and reinforced the belief that background and past conduct was a good 
predictor of future performance. If Peake could remind the management of their past per-
formance – its phases, leaders, and the bank’s history from the first Lloyd to Harald Peake 
– he could remind them of their longevity and successes. By identifying it as a consistent 
theme, good performance was not a one-off. It could be thought of as a tradition and a 
constant feature which might be perpetuated. Success would become a rule and tradition 
Figure 2. Portrait of sampson lloyd, 1765.
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that would be followed by future generations. In contrast, Peake was not interested in finding 
the image of those related to someone with a scandalous or negative reputation, like James 
Taylor (1783–1852), who was the last member of the Taylor family involved in the bank. Taylor 
was remembered more for his son, James Arthur Taylor’s interest in gambling than his own 
contribution in the bank.23 By linking banking to the crown, Lucas also affirmed the social 
status of the family in the upper echelons of London’s wealthy elite – a point that the portraits 
did nothing to dislodge.
Symbols of high social status
Those who were wealthy individuals and followed the traditions of people in power, as well 
as the upper and middling classes, sat for their portraits (Townsend-Gault 1988). As the 
Lloyds family and their descendants had featured in portraiture, their picture when displayed 
implied implicitly that they were of high social status. Yet, this message was something that 
Peake had to work upon. When a family member wrote to Peake about the portrait of Timothy 
Kendrick, chairman from 1865 to 1968, it seemed that they did not value it highly. They wrote 
that they had 
no idea who the Artist was and, to my untutored eye, it does not seem to be a particularly good 
painting … I am afraid that it is in bad condition. Nevertheless, I suppose that a poor portrait 
is better than none.24
 Other portraits were also in a bad condition. Peake said that the portrait of Sampson Samuel 
Lloyd ‘was in a shocking condition, with one or two bad gashes in the canvas’.25 Shabby or 
poor paintings suggested that family members did not value these objects.
In collecting these paintings, the evaluation process also entailed finding out basic details 
of the portrait’s creation, as those who owned it had often forgotten its origins.26 Peake 
believed it was likely that distinguished individuals painted the pictures because of the 
family’s prominence. On 17 August 1965, Peake wrote to Hallam, one of the managers in 
Lloyds, to say that 
it will be interesting to hear if Mr. Pawsey is able to make a reasonable accurate attribution as 
regards the artist. This should not be too difficult as one would assume that the family would 
have employed an artist who was nearing or was at the top of his profession at the date which 
is established by the document Sampson Lloyd is holding.
 Peake’s expectation was not unreasonable. The Lloyds were affluent businessmen, like many 
other country bankers of the period. Pressnell’s (1956, 13) seminal text noted that ‘[s]ome-
times the [country] banker was a prosperous gentleman’ who entered banking to ‘alleviate 
the boredom of retirement or the idleness of country life’ or to ‘provide a local means of 
payment’. The Lloyds and Taylors illustrate this point well – before coming to banking, they 
traded in iron and owned a local mill. Yet, even with the family’s high social status, Pawsey 
was not able to establish the identity of the artist.
Of those chairmen not of the original Lloyds or Taylor family, Salt and Phillips had similar 
social positions as the two shared a background in private banking. Thomas Salt hailed from 
a landed family of Huguenot descent and a family of private bankers in Stafford. He was 
educated at Balliol College, Oxford and came into Lloyds service after his private bank amal-
gamated with Lloyds. Salt, like Sampson Samuel Lloyd, had a parliamentary career from 1859 
to 1892 (Jeremy 1984a, 5:26–29). John Spencer Phillips followed Salt and he, like Salt, was a 
partner in a private bank and came to Lloyds after they merged. He read law at Trinity College, 
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Cambridge and married the daughter of Major-General Tidy (Jeremy 1984b, 4:676, 677). Due 
to the time Phillips spent at the bank, Cassis and Cottrell (2015, 213) considered that he was 
the first chairman that ‘remotely approached the definition of a modern professional banker’. 
Although Salt and Phillips were not part of the Lloyds family, they both stood as men of 
wealth and came from an elite background. Their portraits signaled continuity with the past 
– that despite the fact that non-family members had become present on the board, these 
new recruits had the same attributes as Lloyd’s family members, including Peake himself. 
Creating the collection would reinforce Peake’s social capital. Yet, beyond his immediate 
personal interests, the development of this tradition also legitimized the rise of non-family 
members in the senior management of the organization. The display of the portraits created 
an unbroken lineage within the company that brought together family and non-family mem-
bers as part of the same legacy. The paintings enhanced organizational identity, using the 
past but linking the bank’s history with its current position.
An artist with a good reputation signified quality and carried connotations for the sitter’s 
social standing. In contrast to some of the other portraits, the family believed that they knew 
the artist of the picture of John Taylor II and that it had been captured by the famous painter, 
Thomas Gainsborough.27 After some research, the art specialists determined that Thomas 
Gainsborough had not painted it but, in fact, it was the work of his lesser-known nephew, 
Gainsborough Dupont. Gainsborough Dupont adopted his uncle’s style, and this explained 
the initial error in judgment and the dashing of hopes. Not too disappointed by this result, 
the name of Gainsborough Dupont was emblazoned on the portrait’s frame. As portrait 
painters did not always sign their work (Townsend-Gault 1988, 517–519), many of the other 
artists could not be traced and remain unidentified. As Pointon (1984) noted, there were 
very few portrait painters with a reputation, like Gainsborough or Reynolds; the rest were 
relative unknowns. Gainsborough Dupont was the most well-known artist in Peake’s collec-
tion. Peake played the hand that he was dealt. The art collection was not painted by a host 
of prestigious artists nor was it worth a magnificent sum. Rather, the paintings were of those 
relevant to the bank’s history. Peake did not push further to reassert the position of the sitter 
by introducing new detail or making substantive changes to the painting itself. The art 
tended to be on loan from the family and if it was not, then the bank paid for a direct copy 
and replica of the original.28 Table 1 provides a more detailed analysis of each painting. Peake 
asked that if changes were made, the replicas could be made ‘without making them look 
too new’.29 The pictures maintained the portrait’s content and whatever symbolism was 
encapsulated in the image in terms of the sitter’s face, body, clothing, or his background.30 
The replica existed as exact copy and could pass as a genuine historical artifact. Its authen-
ticity accentuated its capability to represent history in a seemingly accurate way (Guthey 
and Jackson 2005).
Despite Peake’s intentions to preserve a legitimate account of the past, he made a number 
of soft changes to make the work appear less shabby and more appealing. When speaking 
of the portrait of John Taylor I as shown in Figure 3, Peake commented that this ‘portrait is 
by an unknown artist’ and even quipped that it ‘is not a great work of art’. He did, ‘[o]n the 
other hand’, think it to be ‘quite pleasing’.31 As the final statement suggested, Peake could 
and did enhance the image through minor modifications. One simple way to raise the quality 
of the picture was to use better quality paint when the portrait was copied. The task was 
given to those known to produce good quality replicas. For the originals, which were given 
or loaned to the bank, the art company could undertake cleaning and/or varnishing.32 The 
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process of restoration and any minor change made to the painting was undertaken slowly 
and at considerable expense.33 Another alteration that was possible to make was in relation 
to the frame. It was often, like the painting, in poor condition. Here, Peake found suitable 
and complimentary replacements.34
According to Wu (2003, 11), ‘art has long been patronized by those with power and status 
in society, and artistic products have thus always functioned as a status symbol as well as 
objects with market value’. Even if these damaged artworks were painted by unknown artists 
and had little market value, Peake repaired the portraits and stage-managed their setting 
to ensure that viewers would see them as elegant center pieces. These objects could still 
serve as an indicator of high social class.
The group of chairmen and other senior staff shown in the pictures held a solid place 
among the high-powered social and political elite and this was especially apparent for Peake’s 
immediate predecessors.35 Lord Franks (1954–1962), Lord Balfour of Burleigh (1945–1954), 
and Lord Wardington (1922–1945) were members of the aristocracy with a wide range of 
political commitments. Sir Richard Vassar Smith (1909–1922) was a Baronet and a life-peer 
in the House of Lords but, as Cassis (1994, 58) puts it, ‘the demands of the chairmanship of 
a big bank made a real banker of him’. Unlike this crop of chairmen, the general managers 
were generally lower middle class and one came from the working classes. The only image 
Figure 3. Portrait of John taylor, 1765.
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of a general manager which Peake collected and displayed was the likeness of Howard Lloyd, 
who became general manager in 1871 and a director after he retired.36 This group of chair-
men were not career bankers; they were not known for climbing the corporate ladder or 
activity in the day-to-day running of the bank. These responsibilities were entrusted to the 
general managers rather than chairmen. The portrait gallery therefore exhibited the faces 
of those men – as all past chairmen were men – who were largely born into wealth and a 
prominent position within the corporate and political economy.
Sir Harald Peake’s early life was typical of the past chairmen.37 Official Lloyds bank historian 
Winton made it clear that Peake, in his role as chairman, ‘left [the bank’s affairs] to the general 
management to deal with, although Peake wished to be consulted, and convinced, about 
major issues’ (Winton, 1982, 170). Winton believed ‘[o]ne of Peake’s main objectives’ was ‘to 
improve communications, particularly with shareholders and staff’. His ambition here owed 
much to his prior experience in public relations. In the military, Peake served as Director of 
the Auxiliary Air force in 1938 until he was promoted to Director of Public Relations in the 
Air Ministry in 1940 and later became Director of the Air Force Welfare in 1942. When Peake 
left the office of the Director of Public Relations on 10 January 1942, The Times reported that 
he had been ‘responsible for all forms of news, publicity and propaganda for the RAF …. [it 
was] no easy task’. When Peake was at Lloyds, the bank learned from his experience and 
began to revitalize its marketing campaign to generate a better relationship with the press, 
more publicity, and promotional materials. The first step was to appoint a public relations 
officer and the second stage to evaluate their current output.
There were other similarities between Peake’s earlier plans to develop advertising tech-
niques in the RAF and his activities in Lloyds. Peake was something of an art connoisseur 
who was familiar with the world of art as a patron. In his prior professional roles in opening 
up channels of communications at the RAF, both external and internal, Peake engaged in 
the sale and loan of art. He formed part of a committee which targeted members of the 
Central Institute of Art and Design as well as readers of newspapers to find artwork for display 
in RAF messes. The call for artwork entitled ‘Art and the RAF’ (1942) stated that:
Works of art can be found for every type of station and it does not take very many of them to 
give an attractive appearance to an otherwise bare room. The effect of a homely and restful 
atmosphere … has been found to be much appreciated at the few stations which have been 
able to obtain pictures for their messes and to be definitive benefit to their moral.
Applications would be sent directly to Peake and some would even be displayed in the 
National Gallery.
Artwork was thus a medium through which Peake had used previously as a tool to com-
municate within an organization. Yet, although the two projects, collecting art for the RAF 
and acquiring of portraits of past chairmen in Lloyds, looked very similar, they had distinctly 
different aims. Any illustration, painting, or sculpture would be suitable for the purpose of 
raising morale in the barracks. For Lloyds, on the other hand, Peake sought pictures which 
pertained specifically to the bank’s history, and that spoke more directly of the organization’s 
history, culture and purpose.
Whitley (1974, 80) argued that ‘directors undergo a remarkably similar educational expe-
rience and, to some extent, have similar social circles as evidenced by club membership and 
kinship links’. Peake’s portraits stood as evidence of the intricate web of economic and social 
networks that he operated in. Their acquisition was a sign that he moved and belonged 
among the high-powered political elite and families of his predecessors. Corporate art 
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consolidated Peake’s dominant position and status within Lloyds and the social life of the 
corporate elite. Useem (1984, 3) considered those particularly well-connected in the corpo-
rate elite to be a ‘politically active group of directors and top managers’ who gave ‘coherence 
and direction to the politics of business’. The following section examines a political dimension 
of the collection of these portraits by Peake in light of the threats from the Labour and the 
working class movement about nationalizing the bank.
The tradition of private ownership
During the 1920s, the Labour Party in the United Kingdom first suggested nationalizing the 
Bank of England, thus sparking bankers to vigorously voice opposition to state ownership 
in banking (Newton 2003, 150, 151). The threat of socialism was real for bankers, and they 
warned of ‘the danger of State ownership leading to the control of the banking system for 
political purposes’ (Bankers’ Magazine, 1925, Vol. 119, 843–4). The Bank of England was nation-
alized in 1946. The credibility of the threat of nationalization for retail banks increased during 
Peake’s tenure, in particular in 1971 when the annual Labour Party conference passed two 
resolutions advocating that the next Labour Party election manifesto should include pro-
posals to nationalize all banks and insurance companies (Pollard 1979 181, 182). Documents 
from the ‘Bank Nationalization Working Party’ of the Committee of London Clearing Bankers 
show that the threat of the nationalization of the clearing banks remained a concern for the 
‘Big Five’ into the 1970s. This involved substantial investment of time and money into anti-na-
tionalization advertising campaigns and commissioning of research into public attitudes 
towards banks and bank nationalization.38 This section recreates a timeline of events which 
prompted and supported Peake’s long-standing interests in the pictures of past chairmen. 
Although the material in the archive has been structured thematically, we can create a rough 
timeline of events, or at least indicate when Peake began to put pen to paper and began 
engaging in serious letter writing. It is possible to see how it corresponded with calls for 
bank nationalization.
Harald Peake commenced collecting artwork for Lloyds in the mid-1960s and undertook 
this task personally, despite his seniority in the bank and despite other pressing engage-
ments. Peake began working to establish a collection of portraits in around 1965 when he 
was chairman, and these efforts did not cease when he left office in 1972. His notes indicated 
that the collection of past chairmen was completed in 1977. Peake’s project had at times 
crept beyond its original scope and, as Table 1 shows, he also had portraits of other influential 
people such as the founding partners. His death in 1978 stopped further activity.
Aside from Peake’s role in Lloyds, he represented a number of other businesses.39 One 
factor which threatened these companies was public ownership. Peake had served as a 
director or chairman in many other companies and several industries that had experienced 
nationalization (the iron and steel sector) and, certainly from the perspective of bankers, the 
possibility loomed over the banking sector, albeit with varying degrees of strength, during 
the twentieth century. With hindsight, we now know that Lloyds would not succumb to 
public ownership in Peake’s lifetime, but this was far from clear for those situated within 
banking at the time.
The Labour party’s policy of nationalization reached its climax in the 1940s as the gov-
ernment placed firms in the coal mining, telecommunications, civil aviation, railways, road 
transport, electricity, gas, and iron and steel industries under public ownership (Barry 1965, 
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471, 472). While the Bank of England was the only bank to be nationalized in 1946, Turner’s 
(2014) work shows the remaining banks saw public ownership as a real and frightening 
prospect. By the early 1960s, the Labour party continued in this general direction, but its 
pledges became less clear and more ambiguous. After winning the general election in 1964 
with a slim majority, Labour, under the leadership of Harold Wilson, promised to nationalize 
the iron and steel industry. Nationalization continued to be a prospect in banking even after 
the government created the Girobank in 1968 to serve those in the working classes who 
were not customers of the big five retail banks.40 With a set of sweeping statements on what 
would be nationalized and by asserting a general commitment to the policy, the party’s 
stance meant that any eventuality could be a possibility. Banks, like Lloyds, were not left on 
the nationalization agenda nor were they left out of it. Ambiguity invited others to try to 
derive distinct meanings from Wilson’s speeches and other policy documents (Wickham-
Jones 1996, 93).
Wilson’s Personal Record (1971) of his time as Prime Minister between 1964 and 1970 
reveals little about his or his cabinet’s plans to nationalize. The gap or lack of detail here 
suggests that public ownership was not really on his agenda, but this explanation is to some 
extent contradicted by the nature of the document. While it was written chronologically as 
a diary, it still bears all the hallmarks of a memoir. Despite its 800-page length, it was selective 
in its narrative so maintained its ability to project a strong vision of Wilson’s time in office 
(Morgan 1992, 378, 379). Wilson’s book (1971; Morgan 1992, 378, 379) indicates that when 
in government, he found it unexpectedly challenging to persuade even some of his fellow 
Labour MPs to pass the bill in 1965 to nationalize the steel industry – a promise he had made 
clear and up front in his election campaign only a year earlier. Although a grand and sweep-
ing program of nationalization was thought to have been on the cards in the run-up to the 
election, Wilson did not recall any other exchanges in his memoirs about the issue after the 
events in 1965. While these discussions may well have taken place after this point, Wilson 
would not have wished to dwell on heated or tense internal debates as they would not 
present him in the most authoritative light. Wilson may well have underplayed any internal 
difficulties when he recalled the events in his premiership as his memoir was written and 
published in the run up to the 1970 general election. Nationalization was not an issue that 
Labour wished to push in the 1970 election either. To construct the graph shown in 
Figure 4, Butler and Pinto-Duschinsky’s (1971, 441, 442) counted the number of times can-
didates mentioned the term ‘nationalization’ in their speeches. In 1970, the figure for Labour’s 
mentions had fallen to just 3 per cent from what had been a key issue and battleground in 
previous elections.
Despite Wilson’s reluctance to press public ownership or put it to an open vote in parlia-
ment, the debate about whether the public should own companies or sectors, raged on 
inside Labour, especially after Callaghan took over. The Labour Programme of 1973, 1976, 
and 1982 proposed nationalization in some shape or form; one called for the nationalization 
of twenty-five out of the top 100 companies, another for at least a firm in each of the sectors. 
Indeed, towards the end of Wilson’s reign as Labour leader in the 1970s, the party saw serious 
merits in public ownership once again and sought to firm up their election pledges. At several 
points, as Table 2 shows, groups, such as those at the 1971 Labour Party conference, the TUC, 
Home Policy Committee, voted in favor of nationalization of the banking sector. As the unions 
did not support these ideas, they proved to be the force stopping further action (USDAW, 
‘Statement on Banking and Finance’, RE: 1012/Feb 1977, APEX, ‘The Banking and Finance 
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Sector’, RE: 1034/March 1977). Another break on the nationalization of British banks was the 
complaints of reluctant politicians, like Lord Lever.41 While the Labour party members may 
have pushed for specific aims and objectives, Wilson, in particular, strived to achieve vague 
promises which were more capable of being kept.
Questions and debates about nationalization were rife among Labour politicians and 
supporters as Peake collected and exhibited the portraits. While the political discussions did 
not bear fruit, the contemplation of nationalizing the ‘Big five’ banks and the continual back 
and forth between Labour and the Conservative governments (see Table 3) meant that no 
business felt entirely settled. As Posner (1972, 247) indicated, even in the Conservative years 
between 1970 and 1974, they did not engage in a straightforward program of denationiza-
tion. Heath, the Tory Prime Minister, nationalized Rolls Royce after the firm’s failure in 1971 
– a company in which Peake worked as a director.42
What were Peake’s personal views on public ownership? In an article published in The 
Times on 8 January 1958, Peake was, he said, ‘against indulging openly in politics’ and ‘thought 
it would be quite wrong … to come out in a very bellicose way’. Peake was really not that 
coy in revealing whether he held a view on the subject of public ownership but he did 
manage to present his ideas in a gentlemanly and non-confrontational manner. In the same 
article, as the chairman of the Steel Company of Wales, Peake wrote to ‘appeal most earnestly 
to all those who believe in the theory of nationalization to take now a practical view in the 
national interest’. When he was chairman of Airedale Collieries in 1946, the AGM report of 
Table 2. labour’s policy on nationalization.
1965: Bill to nationalize steel industry passes after some disagreement among labour MPs
1969: Agenda for a generation – no strong commitment to public ownership
1970: Now Britain’s strong: let’s make it great to live in – no strong commitment to public ownership
1971: Party conference votes in favor of public ownership in banking
1973: tUC voted in favor of public ownership in banking
1973: Labour’s Programme – in favor of public ownership generally
1976: Labour’s Programme – in favor of public ownership generally
1976: Banking and finance – advocates nationalization of big four banks and passed at party conference
1979: labour’s manifesto – banks for public ownership in first draft but dropped in final copy
1982: Labour’s Programme – in favor of public ownership generally
1982: Home policy committee voted to restore commitment to nationalize big four banks but rejected at party 
conference
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
1950 1951 1955 1959 1964 1966 1970
M
en
tio
ns
 (%
)
Year
Conservatives Labour
Figure 4. Variations in candidates’ mentions of ‘nationalistion’, 1950–1970.
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July 3 in The Times noted that the board had come to ‘accept the fact that the present 
Government at the General Election last July had obtained a mandate for the nationalization 
of the coal industry’ while ‘disagreeing fundamentally with the policy of nationalization’. 
Butler and Rose (1960, 252, 253) estimated that in the run up to the 1959 election, the iron 
and steel companies spent around £1.5 million on an anti-nationalization campaign. To put 
this figure into context, it was about four times the Conservative party spending on adver-
tising and fourteen times the Labour party’s. While Peake may have made a rather modest 
political plea, his words understated his commitment to private ownership.
The fear of nationalization appeared as a theme through conversation and private cor-
respondence about the bank’s portraits. Peake promised the Lloyds family that if the bank 
became nationalized, he would return the portraits to the family. He described a conversation 
in 1966 which began when he showed a renovated portrait to David Lloyd, a director at that 
time, after a recent meeting. Peake wrote to the person who had possessed the portrait to 
inform them that 
David was most interested to see the picture …. He would, however, like to make appease 
that under certain conditions the family might ask for its return. He has in mind the unlikely 
circumstances of the large Banks being nationalized and run by people whose object would 
be to break down past tradition.
Peake did not assert that the painting showed the bank’s history as a private enterprise. 
Indeed, from his letter, it appeared that this interpretation of the portrait’s meaning or sym-
bolism came from the director not Peake himself. In response, however, Peake did not refute 
this interpretation or the claim that the bank could at some point be nationalized. Peake 
consented to this translation of the portrait’s symbolic meaning as he granted David Lloyd’s 
request: he agreed that if the bank’s present ‘character’ changed, the portraits would be 
returned.43
These letters indicated that whatever meaning Peake believed that he had ascribed to 
the portraits, those in the senior management who viewed the images understood their 
meaning in relation to the nationalization debate. The link between the portraits, the organ-
ization’s past and present debate over public ownership did not fade over time. Over ten 
years later, this subject came up in conversation again as the bank’s representatives wrote 
to Lord Lloyd, who had a claim to the ownership of the picture of Sampson Lloyd III. He was 
told that: the portrait will be on loan ‘so long as the bank remains an independent institution, 
i.e. is not nationalized … [but] in the event of impending nationalization, we will use our 
best endeavors to ensure that you are given first options to buy the picture’.44 Those in senior 
management and members of the Lloyds family repeated and legitimized the interpretation 
of the pictures of past chairman in light of the threat of nationalization.
Table 3. timeline of elections between 1964 and 1985.
Year Government Labour leader Conservative leader
1964 labour wins general election with small majority Harold Wilson alec Douglas-Home
1966 labour wins general election Harold Wilson edward Heath
1970 Conservatives win general election Harold Wilson edward Heath
1974 labour wins general election and forms minority 
government
Harold Wilson edward Heath
1974 labour wins general election with small majority Harold Wilson/James Callaghan edward Heath
1979 Conservatives win general election James Callaghan Margaret thatcher
1983 Conservatives win general election Michael Foot Margaret thatcher
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The story which came to be told through the portrait collection was partly a response to 
the debates over public ownership in the sectors of banking and finance. In Peake’s time as 
chairman, Lloyds experienced something in the way of organizational change, including the 
process of computerization and a failed merger between Barclays, Lloyds, and Martins in 
1968.45 Neither of these points was discussed in the written evidence of Peake’s conversa-
tions. It seems that organizational change was not a key driver in Peake’s gathering of these 
paintings. Equally, the chronology itself does not quite fit for organizational change to be a 
credible explanation for his activity. Two weeks prior to the announcement of the proposed 
Barclays–Lloyds–Martins merger in 1968, a merger between another two banks in the big 
four/five, National Provincial and Westminster bank, occurred. The first amalgamation was 
the catalyst for the proposal of the second. Peake said in an interview with The Times pub-
lished on 9 February 1968 that 
the Natpro-Westminster merger … was a complete shock to us. We understood right until then 
that the authorities would not approve mergers on this scale. The Colwyn Committee of 50 years 
ago seemed pretty clear on the subject and we thought it still stood.
 The proposal between Barclays and Lloyds happened, as Peake explained, because he and 
the chairman of Barclays ‘just happened to be in the same room’. This plan of events was, 
therefore, not a long-term one and happened after Peake had already started his portrait 
collection. Peake had begun to collect portraits a few years earlier in 1966 – a date which 
coincided with when Harold Wilson began his first term in office. Thus, external political 
change appears to have been more of a motivation for Peake in his desire to collect the 
portraits much more than organizational change.
During Peake’s time as chairman, Lloyds was caught in a moment of political upheaval. 
There was a pressing case for public ownership which Peake and other senior managers 
responded to by highlighting the firm’s successful past as a capitalist enterprise. Other banks 
dealt with the threat of nationalization more directly in discussions with their employees. 
For example, as the threat continued into the 1970s, Barclays issued a pamphlet internally 
in 1977 to advise its employees of the ‘facts’ of nationalization. The leaflet supported the 
message in its opening paragraph: opinion was firmly against nationalization. Employees 
who read the leaflet learned that if the banks were nationalized, branches might close and 
jobs might be lost under the guise of ‘rationalization’. It suggested that the banks were 
unlikely to retain their current service with customers and identity under public ownership. 
While addressed to an internal audience, it had an external function.46 It encouraged the 
reader – if they felt inclined to have a say – to ‘write to your MP’, ‘[d]iscuss bank nationalization 
with your friends’, ‘[d]raw … [customers’] attention to [the bank’s] posters and advertisements 
on display in your branch’. Members of staff, alongside advertisements in the branches, were 
thought of as a useful way to influence public opinion and external actors.
Peake’s portraits also constituted part of a positive campaign to communicate to an inter-
nal audience, and to promote private ownership positively rather than negatively campaign-
ing against nationalization. The paintings reminded senior managers viewing them of the 
successes that the firm had experienced; it sold the virtues of the firm’s history of capitalism 
and free enterprise. By referencing history and tradition, the portraits reminded employees 
that these rules had been in place for a long time and as workers had joined and stayed, 
they had come to accept these ideas whether explicitly or implicitly. As the images suggested 
that the group always agreed with private ownership, staff members had lost their 
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opportunity to challenge or refute the idea of private enterprise. Staff, who saw private 
ownership as a valuable tradition, could perhaps even persuade outsiders to accept their 
view.
What internal threats prompted Peake’s portrait collection? How did members of staff 
see the left-wing movement? During this period Peake, as chairman, worked well with two 
Chief General Managers (the equivalent of today’s CEO): Wharburton from 1959 to 1966 and 
Wilson from 1967 to 1973 (Winton, 1982, 169–174). The senior management team appeared 
to work harmoniously. The executives at Lloyds had a distant relationship with the trade 
union for bank workers, Lloyds bank staff association and those workers who wished to 
bargain collectively. At some banks, such as Barclays, representatives of special worker groups 
liaised effectively with senior managers, often influencing their decision-making in a more 
democratic fashion (see Barnes and Newton, 2017b). Yet, this was not the case in Lloyds. A 
Lloyds employee wrote in the National Union of Bank Employees’ (NUBE) magazine that the 
majority of board appointment holders exhibited ‘fear, snobbishness or unreasonable prej-
udice against trade unions in general (and often all three)’ (NUBE News, August 1970, No. 8, 
10. British Library, P515/109). A retired manager reported here that ‘there still seems to be 
a feeling among senior staff, that it is not the “done” thing to be in the Union’ (NUBE News, 
October 1970, No. 10, 9. British Library, P515/109). By 1973, NUBE reported that there had 
been an ‘influx’ of Lloyds staff into the Union, although no corresponding figures were pro-
vided (NUBE News, October 1973, No. 46, 6. British Library, P515/109). NUBE claimed to have 
88,000 members in 1970 (NUBE News, August 1970, No. 8, 10. British Library, P515/109). 
Blackburn (1967, 273) asserts that in 1964 union density averaged at 31 per cent in the 11 
English clearing banks. Did these unions and their members pose a threat to Lloyds?
The post-1945 period has been described by Cressey and Scott (1992, 84) as a ‘honeymoon 
period in the clearing banks’ that was ‘underpinned by extremely stable, paternalistic indus-
trial relations and personnel management systems’. This, they argued, ‘enabled a quite 
extraordinary degree of labor and organizational stability and bequeathed a legitimising 
corporate culture based on caution, deference and loyalty’. Likewise, Storey (1995) stated 
that industrial relations in the clearing banks were orderly, peaceful, and centralized until 
the 1990s. Gall (2001, 357) has described ‘extensive recognition of trade and staff unions for 
representation, consultation and collective bargaining’ as contributing to such stable labor 
relations. Moreover, pay and working conditions were good (Gall 2001, 362). As a result, male 
staff turnover was low (Nakano 1993, 128). Turnover of staff among women was higher. This 
was relevant as the number of women employed by the clearing banks increased between 
1945 and 1970 to the extent that they outnumbered men by the end of the 1960s.47 Despite 
growth in the numbers of female staff, women were not found in senior positions as there 
were limited opportunities for promotion among female staff (Adams and Harte 1998, 794–
796). However, the lack of progress did not lead to labor unrest even though women were 
present in the unions.
Members thought that the staff associations were too compliant with the banks them-
selves. A letter from B.A. Harris in NUBE News complained about the ineffective nature of 
negotiations between staff and senior management at Lloyds bank in 1970, urging managers 
to join the Trade Union instead. He claimed that: ‘Had my senior colleagues had the guts in 
the past to stand up and protest, as they are doing now at managers’ meetings, matters 
would now be very different’. He was scathing about the role of staff associations: as ‘the 
only voices reaching the general management are soothing whispers from the Staff 
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Association’ (NUBE News, August 1970, No. 8, 10. British Library, P515/109). However, mem-
bers of staff were not always satisfied with representation from the Trade Union NUBE as it 
was less able to deal with grass roots, local issues than the staff associations (Nakano 1993, 
149, 150). Therefore, bank staff themselves were not united in the stand they took against 
senior management.
National negotiations were introduced in 1968 through the Joint Negotiating Council for 
Banking, comprising staff associations as well as NUBE and bank representatives. This 
changed little as the workforce remained compliant. Despite the introduction of national 
bargaining by trade unions in 1968, and action on improved pay and conditions for workers, 
such activities do not appear to have been seen a major threat by senior bank executives. 
On key issues, such as nationalization, workers and senior managers appear to have been 
in agreement. Indeed, acting with skepticism toward unions, as well as working class and 
left-wing politics, Peake’s letters do not speak to this constituency but rather to those who 
voiced like-minded conservative views
Peake’s desire to collect portraits and change perceptions of viewers understanding of 
their value was influenced by nationalization. However, nationalization was not a consistent 
threat throughout the period. Internal organizational change occurred but was not men-
tioned as a driving factor in collecting the artwork. Nor was any threat from bank workers 
or their trade unions spoken of, despite growing collective action of workers. While there 
were waves of political leaders with different attitudes towards private ownership, the inter-
mittent calls for public ownership did not calm those at the helm of big business. Peake, as 
an old-Etonian, a statesman and career director, who sat on the boards of companies in 
nationalized industries, therefore felt this threat most of all.
Discussion of findings
The existing historical literature explains the process by which traditions are created and 
the importance of repetition in solidifying the symbolic meaning of the tradition. Hobsbawm 
(1983) is clear that these traditions can be invented and embed norms and values, as well 
as implying continuity with the past. In collecting portraits of past chairmen of Lloyds Bank, 
Peake, in part, continued a tradition. The bank already held four portraits of these individuals. 
But he also invented a new tradition by ensuring that the bank would commission portraits 
of subsequent chairmen. The portraits certainly presented continuity with the past, despite 
changes in the composition of the board of directors, as non-family members were intro-
duced onto the board from the 1960s onwards. At the same time as Peake began his portrait 
collection, Humphrey Lloyd was writing a book about the history of the Lloyds family more 
broadly. The two actors worked in tandem with each other. Both Peake’s collection of portraits 
and Lloyd’s writing of the book sought to emphasize the family tradition of the bank, as well 
as the success of the institution and the families that had founded it. As British banks became 
modern corporate entities in the twentieth century, remembering the importance of those 
who had guided Lloyds successfully in the past to its present status as one of the ‘Big 5’ 
United Kingdom retail banks was important in retaining its organizational identity, both 
internally and externally. Indeed, the portraits formed part of a collective memory for the 
bank which, in turn, provided the foundation for its identity in an era of rapid changes in 
markets, technology, and the political landscape.
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The use of portraits of past chairmen of Lloyds bank can be viewed as involving sense 
making for the company (Ravasi and Schultz 2006). It helped the senior management of the 
bank who viewed these paintings of the past to make sense of the bank as it stood at that 
present time and, possibly, in the future (Schultz and Hernes 2013). The portraits indicated 
a long and successful tradition and a foundation for the bank’s current identity. The men in 
the paintings presented an example for future generations. The portraits played a role in 
remembering the past but, also, in re-membering the history of the bank in light of current 
questions. These men formed part of the human history on which the bank’s existing success 
was founded (Suddaby, Foster and Mills 2013, 113, 114). The detail of this human history 
usually faded with time but the symbolism of the images of past leaders was likely to have 
permitted the bank’s senior management of the 1960s and 1970s to identify with these 
individuals, to participate in the continuing building of organizational identity, and to 
remember the history of the bank in a way in that could allow them to take the steer the 
bank into the future.
The collection of portraits of past chairmen of Lloyds bank, and their subsequent display 
at the bank’s headquarters, is a micro-level study. It takes the action of a particular chairman 
and attempts to analyze his use of history and the reasons behind this project. Thus, this 
article develops an answer to the question of why a tradition would be invented in the first 
place. However, Peake did not at any point in his letters give a reasoned explanation for the 
act of collecting and displaying the portraits. It is perhaps unreasonable to expect historic 
actors to express their intentions and desires so bluntly or directly. Peake, like the other 
senior managers at Lloyds, was part of an elite group and so his manner was soft and indirect 
in a fashion that was typical in some parts of British society. Equally, symbolism is, by its very 
nature, a way to communicate and disguise messages; it is suggestive rather than explicit. 
The portrait, by its existence, indicates the giving of honor and prestige upon the sitter, as 
well as implying a history and tradition in a given institutional setting (Barnes and Newton 
2017a).
Without explicit discussion, it is impossible to show direct causation and to provide a 
single answer to the questions of what caused Peake to act in this way and how his contem-
poraries viewed the portraits. This analysis groups the discussions into three main explana-
tions: signaling continued histories of family tradition, high social status, and private 
ownership, all of which link to organizational identity. These rationalizations are not in com-
petition with one another, nor does one preclude the existence of the others.
There are some historical methodological underpinnings that enable us to ascertain a 
reliable interpretation of Peake’s behavior and its shared meaning. The display of portraits 
of chairmen past and present hung in Lloyds’ head office could signal many different mes-
sages to many different individuals. Indeed, there is a danger that we – as contemporaries 
– read in our own interpretation of those portraits. To combat the problem of subjectivity, 
the article is built upon our interpretation of Peake’s intentions and the receivers under-
standing of the portraits as shown through Peake’s private letters about the portraits. These 
sources are given primacy because they are private documents and thus provide the most 
reliable and objective account of individual’s viewpoint which is available to us as historians. 
The writer of these messages gives an honest account of his or her feelings that it is unfet-
tered by worries of public readership, censure, or disapproval. Explanations are extrapolated 
from these sources and secondary material. In our analysis of the Peake’s letters, the decision 
to retell a narrative of an organization’s history was prompted by a variety of factors, both 
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external and internal. The influence of external pressures raises the most interesting points 
for further studies.
In addition to archival sources, we also draw upon secondary literature to look to verify 
or contradict our findings. The creation of organizational memories tends to be documented 
as part of a case study of an organization in a period of transition or other organizational 
change, as with Lego and Carlsberg (Schultz and Hernes 2013; Hatch and Schultz, 2017). As 
well as internal pressures, Bucheli and Kim (2014, 241) encourage a focus upon the external 
relationship between businesses and the state as ‘firms do not operate in a vacuum and that 
politics and political actors exert significant influence on corporate behavior’. This study 
supports this idea as it shows that observers viewed Peake’s actions not only as a result of 
the ordinary organizational drivers, but also perceived in light of ongoing political ideas and 
the discussion of bank nationalization. Indeed, this pressure did not come from those within 
the organization or from the lower ranks of employees. Placing decisions in their original 
historical context allows us to gain a better understanding of why events occurred and how 
decisions were understood. While literal interpretations of internal documentation and inter-
views can give rise to important findings, some meanings may not be as easily identified 
but are as equally valid. It is often the case that we must look outside the confines of the 
organization and business archive to find the socio-political context and the meaning of 
acts as might be intended or perceived by others.
Conclusion
Traditions can be used to draw attention to a set of ideas, norms, and values. Displays of 
tradition, through an artifact or routine, can give rise to a discussion of the values or norms 
which initiated it. The articulation of those ideas explains the values which have or have not 
been accepted by the group to those carrying out or observing the action. If these objects 
or habits can be interpreted to be age-old, they suggest a sense of longevity and that the 
values have been embedded within the fiber of the organization since time immemorial. 
Their display hinders any challenge to those values by asserting that they have already been 
accepted and the opportunity to object has passed. By preventing resistance or the existence 
of a counter story, it is assumed that the dominant values will continue.
This case study contributes to our understanding of what prompts an organization or its 
leaders to invest in creating traditions. Undoubtedly, the identity of the actors is important 
as not all chose to engage in this kind of behavior. Harald Peake, who stands at the center 
of this article, brought together the portraits of those associated with the history of Lloyds 
bank and exhibited them inside the firm’s Head Office. Peake was not viewed as a career 
banker but as a director of many firms in different industries, and one of the corporate elite 
who was a public relations specialist – one that was especially effective in instituting better 
methods of communication between the organization, its employees, shareholders, depos-
itors, customers, and other stakeholders. He excelled in staging a discussion about the organ-
ization’s identity, its past, present, and future direction. Although it takes a particular 
individual with a particular set of skills or interests to pursue a strategy like the one described 
here, the article is concerned with the messages and reasoning behind symbolism rather 
than merely the person establishing them.
While portraiture was an art form that recognized the powerful, Peake did not use por-
traiture in the midst of a crisis to re-assert his own individual personal authority. The portraits 
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suggested that the firm’s progress had been achieved through a long period of careful and 
high-powered leadership. We argue that Peake presented an image of a business’s longevity 
and its heritage. From a small bank founded in Birmingham in the 1700s, the bank had grown 
to become one of the five largest retail banks in the United Kingdom, and it operated a 
branch network that stretched across the nation. Peake’s portrait collection project could 
bolster its internal identity in a large-scale organization.
The portraits of past chairmen told the story of a group of individuals which had led the 
firm from its birth to the present day. As they stood as a collection, it reminded viewers of 
the collective; it did not highlight the exceptional nor individual’s successes but the achieve-
ments of the group. Labour’s threat to nationalize – while neither consistent nor entirely 
convincing – was taken seriously and the subject of state-ownership became a battleground 
in banking. Banks encouraged their staff to take a view against public ownership, discuss 
the policies, and engage in campaigning. The story in Peake’s paintings came to identify a 
tradition which suggested continued leadership, the passing of the baton from one to 
another and it provided a narrative filled with triumphant consistency. Within the context 
of potential nationalization, portraiture stressed the history of Lloyds, a capitalist private 
corporation, as a tradition which had survived and stood the test of time.
Notes
1.  These pictures were viewed taken in late 2016 by one of the authors on a visit to the Head Office.
2.  Peake’s first name is sometimes spelt ‘Harold’ rather than ‘Harald’ but, for consistency, we have 
chosen to follow the spelling in The Peerage and Who’s Who.
3.  The form and style of the portrait is chosen by the previous chairman. Interview with David 
Roberts, Chairman of Nationwide, on 12th April 2016. Roberts served as Deputy-Chairman for 
Lloyds Banking Group from 2010 until 2014, when he became Chairman of the Nationwide 
Building Society. Thanks are due to David Roberts for this information.
4.  Peake’s letters can be found in Lloyds Bank Group Archive (HO/Ch/Off/11). To avoid repetition of 
this reference, all archival references will originate from this collection unless otherwise stated.
5.  Certainly, Weber et al. (1978) saw traditional authority as the tool of those with ‘Eigenwürde’ 
which was translated to the English word, ‘master’. To those in the nineteenth century, a ‘master’ 
would have been the person at the head of a unit or group, such as the husband and father 
in a family or an employer in a business. This translation appears fitting as the party obeying 
or submitting to the master were listed as ‘kinsmen’, ‘slaves’, ‘dependents’, and ‘free men’. All of 
these individuals could qualify as servants or employees.
6.  It is important to point out here that Economy and Society was published posthumously and 
that it was an incomplete draft. These ideas could have been developed further in the finished 
version.
7.  For the difference between accuracy and reliably, and subjectivity and objectivity, see 
Jordanova (2016). She persuasively argues that ‘truth’ and ‘objectivity’ are impossible and 
recreating a reliable account of the past is the best a historian can hope for. The points which 
follow subscribe to these ideas.
8.  Our evidence for this point is the structure of the archival collection itself. Peake’s letters have 
been re-organised and divided and grouped by portrait rather than by date, as would have 
been the natural order. A thematic approach, as opposed to chronological order, would be more 
useful for answering any practical question which may have been posed about the portrait at a 
later date, such as its ownership or value. Within the departmental structure, Lloyds Archivists 
are situated within the internal communications group as part of the Secretaries Department 
rather than in external communications. The archivists in Lloyds are, therefore, important 
gatekeepers in helping to answer any internal questions which might be questions of fact.
9.  Permission is formally granted by the bank to bona fide researchers to view the papers.
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10.  We have unfortunately been unable to trace these views due to a lack of source material in the 
Lloyds Archive and in Lloyds Trade Union. The passage of time also means that oral testimony 
is not a realistic source.
11.  Note for Mr. Nicholl-Carne, 1 June 1966.
12.  Peake’s connection with Lloyds bank started in 1941 when he was elected as a director. He was 
promoted to Vice-chairman in 1947 and eventually, chairman in 1962.
13.  Schultz and Hernes assert that because Lego was a family owned company that it was 
‘particularly concerned with narrating its past’ (2013, 17).
14.  Peake indicated in his letter to Humphrey Lloyd on 18 August 1966 that he already had these 
portraits. The archival collection relates to those paintings that he collected and acquired. We 
presume that these images were commissioned by the bank and such information need not 
be recorded as their ownership was unlikely to be questioned. The bank also asserted some 
control over the future commissioning of images and in the transaction between artist and 
bank as they rejected the first painting of Peake’s successor, Sir Eric Faulker. Note on Portrait 
of Sir Eric Faulkner, 17 August 1977.
15.  Letter to Lady Salt, 31 January 1967.
16.  Peake put thought into the lighting and the portrait’s surroundings to ensure that it stood out. 
He wrote that John Spencer Phillips’s portrait ‘was hung yesterday in a prominent position on 
the main corridor of the Bank, and it looks extraordinary well; it will look better still when we 
have got suitable light fixed over it’. Letter to Mrs. Scott, 15 December 1966.
17.  Letter to Arthur Taylor, September, 1970, Letter to Arthur Taylor, 8 July 1966, Letter to Mrs. 
Scott, 15 December 1966.
18.  Naturally, this convention became more formal after Peake had completed his project.
19.  Note dated 11 October 1966.
20.  Letter to Lord Lloyd, 2 December 1966. The portrait of John Spencer Phillips was hanging in the 
house of a friend of the owner’s because the owner’s home did not have space to accommodate 
it. She also did not believe that her children had an interest in inheriting it. Letter from Mrs. 
Scott, 24 October 1966.
21.  Peake inserted excerpts from Sayers’ (1957) work inside his letters. The collection also contained 
Sayers’ correspondence with various members of staff about the portraits used in his book.
22.  Some connections were more immediate for Humphrey Lloyd as he was married to a Kendrick, 
descendant of Timothy Kendrick, chairman 1865–1868, and he owned a copy of the portrait 
of Howard Lloyd.
23.  Notes on conversation with Mr. Taylor, dated 25 October 1966. Sayers (1957, 29)
24.  See Letter from Denis Martineau, 21 October 1966.
25.  He added that ‘[i]t has been restored at the cost of the Bank’. See Letter to Lord Lloyd, 2 
December 1966.
26.  The family did not know the artist of Sampson Lloyd III’s portrait either.
27.  In hindsight, they seem to be right. Boston Art Museum has a duplicate of the painting and 
documentary evidence associated its past ownership etc. They attribute the portrait to Thomas 
Gainsborough rather than his cousin. See: http://www.mfa.org/collections/object/john-taylor-
1738%E2%80%931814-32185
28.  One request that Peake made frequently was to downsize the portrait if it was copied. While 
a smaller size may have made the images less intimidating, it seemed that Peake strived to 
achieve consistency in size. Peake informed Mr. Bartlett, the manager of the Shrewsbury branch 
who liaised with the portrait’s owner, that the picture of John Spencer Phillips ‘[i]f … a very 
large one it would really suit us best to employ an artist to make a replica, but in a smaller size 
comparable to the other pictures which you have seen here’. Letter to Mr. Bartlett, 4 October 
1966. Salt’s portrait was, for example, 4 ft. 6in by 3 ft. 6 inches and if sat next to another image 
which was vastly smaller or larger, then it may have suggested that one was more important 
than the other. Letter from Lady Salt, 5 October 1966. The size of the portrait was underlined 
in red pencil in the letter. All of the portraits to date are of uniform size.
29.  Letter to Pawsey, 7 June 1966.
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30.  The exception was the image of John Taylor II where the ‘only difference between replica and 
original is that the background of the replica has been painted in so as to avoid the necessity 
of using a gold oval shaped mount’. The mount (or mat as it is known in the United States) is 
the cardboard or paper insert placed directly on top of the picture and located between the 
glass and the picture. It shapes the image and creates an interior border inside the picture 
frame. Letter to Mr. Taylor, 8 July 1966.
31.  Note for Mr. J.W. Libby, dated 19 March 1977.
32.  When the image of John Spencer Philips was loaned to the bank, it undertook ‘superficial 
cleaning, revarnishing and touching up of the frame’. Letter to Mrs. Scott, 15 December 1966. 
Sampson Samuel Lloyd’s picture was ‘repaired, cleaned, and revarnished, with the frame 
touched up’. Letter to Helen Lloyd, 15 December 1966.
33.  Salt’s portrait was taken to be copied in October 1966 and returned in February time, the 
following year. Peake apologized to Lady Salt for having the portrait for such a long period of 
time. Letter to Lady Salt, 31 January 1967. Comments were frequently made by those at the 
bank about finding good painters to make first class replicas.
34.  Peake explained that one picture ‘has been put in a rather lighter [frame] from than the original, 
which seems to suit it very well’ Letter to Lady Salt, 31 January 1967.
35.  Statistical analysis indicates that they came from an economically privileged background having 
been educated first in public schools and then in the leading Oxbridge universities (Stanworth 
and Giddens 1974).
36.  Howard Lloyd, general manager between 1871 and 1902, worked his way up the ranks of 
Lloyds. He began work in the insurance company and moved to the bank where he was first an 
assistant to the partners – some of whom were also his relatives. Although Howard Lloyd had 
a familial connection to the Lloyds, this did not necessarily give him a higher social position 
because of those relationships. Cassis described his father, Isaac Lloyd, as someone who had 
a ‘short’ and ‘unhappy’ career outside of banking before turning to hold ‘subordinate posts in 
a number of provincial banks’. Cassis (1994 126–128).
37.  Born in 1899, Peake was the son of George Herbert Peake and Evelyn Mary Dundas who resided 
in Bawtry Hall, Yorkshire. George Herbert Peake had a varied career as a barrister, Justice of 
the Peace for the West Riding of Yorkshire and later Nottinghamshire, and was Mayor of East 
Retford, a Major in the Sherwood Rangers and Deputy Lieutenant of Nottinghamshire (Mosley 
2003, 2:2044). Alongside political office and his military roles, George Herbert Peake held a 
number of company directorships. Harald Peake followed in his father’s footsteps in several 
respects. He was educated at Eton and studied law at Trinity College, Cambridge. By 1925, 
Harald Peake, at the age of 26, succeeded his father on the board of the Denaby and Cadeby 
Main Collieries, Limited.
38.  See London Metropolitan Archives (LMA), M32142X files 1–12. The perception of threat 
persisted into the 1980s, with the final MORI survey of ‘Public Attitudes to Nationalization’ 
undertaken in 1983. LMA, M32142X11. Also Reveley and Singleton (2014).
39.  He was appointed as a director in Wm. France, Fenwick & Co in 1930, Rolls-Royce, Limited in 
1938, Westinghouse Brake and Signal Company in 1943, Yorkshire Amalgamated Collieries in 
1944, Bank of London and South America in 1949, National Bank of Australasia and London 
Assurance in 1950, the National Bank of Scotland in 1951, Bank of New Zealand in 1966, and 
Systems International in 1971. He was more closely associated with the coal and steel industries, 
as in the Steel Company of Wales, Airedale Collieries Limited, and Hargreaves (Leeds) Limited, 
he served as chairman, and as the managing director of Denaby and Cadeby Main Colleries, 
Limited and Maltby Main Colliery Company, Limited.
40.  For more detail on its formation, see Booth and Billings (2010).
41.  Lever was a Labour politician and also well-respected businessman. Lever announced after the 
publication of Banking and Finance, which advocated that there should be nationalization of the 
British banks or insurance companies, that he would not support such a measure. His speech 
was reported by Hugh Noyes on the front page of The Times on 20th May 1976. Other than 
direct overlaps like Lever, Rollings (2014) shows that until fairly recently captains of industry 
enjoyed annual meetings with senior civil servants and politicians.
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42.  Indeed, Peake was criticized personally for not seeing the crash coming. He was one of the 
more experienced company directors. See The Times, 8 February 1971; 17.
43.  Letter to Miss Lloyd, 15 December 1966.
44.  Letter to Lord Lloyd, 22 July 1977. There are some inconsistencies: this letter made it clear 
that the portrait was on permanent loan not owned by the bank. Yet, other letters seems to 
suggest the opposite and the portrait had been gifted. The bank may have by this point had an 
equitable claim to ownership as it had spent a large sum of money on repairing, re-varnishing 
and cleaning.
45.  The Times reported that the merger if allowed would create a ‘banking Colossus with 5,545 
branches, 6.4 million current accounts, and a staff of 69,700’. Barclays was slightly larger than 
Lloyds although both were part of the big four banks. The Times, 9 February 1968, 15. The 
Monopolies Commission and Chancellor of the Exchequer rejected the proposal on the basis 
of inefficiency. Rather, ironically, the Barclays chairman criticized the report for dwelling on the 
past. See Kenneth Gooding, ‘Commission Finds a Lack of Efficiency’, The Financial Times, 18 July 
1968, 21. See (Winton, 1982, 169).
46.  The leaflet also indicated that Barclays (along with the other banks) had proposed to 
extend their campaign and advertise in the national press. Barclays Group Archives, Internal 
Communications, Anthony Tuke (Chairman), ‘What happens if we’re nationalised?’, 9th May 
1977, B220.
47.  N.U.B.E figures show approximately 47.5% of total bank staff at the end of 1969 were males, 
with 52.5% female.’ NUBE News, May 1970, No. 5, 8. British Library, P515/109.
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